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Trust in alternative and professional media: The case of the youth 
news audiences in three European countries 
This exploratory paper applying cross-cultural and developmental perspective 
analyses and discusses trust in alternative media and its relation to trust in 
professional media, seeking to identify the national specifics of media trust and 
its developmental patterns. Employing 2016 survey data of Czech, Estonian and 
Greek youth (aged 14-25, N=3,654) collected as part of the international 
CATCH-EyoU project (Horizon 2020), the study outlines the typology of media 
trust, comprising trust in alternative and professional media, and compares social 
and political predictors influencing media trust in the three countries. The study 
illustrates the diversity of relations between the two types of media trust, 
concluding that differences in selected predictors of media trust and the 
distribution of media trust types across national sub-samples illuminate the strong 
role national context plays, illustrating the varying pathways development of 
media trust follows in these varied contexts along socioeconomic and cultural 
lines. 
Keywords: trust in alternative media; trust in professional media; adolescents; 
young adults 
Introduction 
In 2003, John D. H. Downing critically noted that there was a significant gap between 
scholarly interest in alternative media (and its production) and the related study of its 
audiences. The further proliferation of the Internet since that time – rendering non-
mainstream media sources evermore-readily accessible as alternative sources of news and 
information – has consequently led to an expansion of theory and research seeking to 
address the transitional nature of alternative media (e.g., Bailey et al., 2008; Couldry & 
Curran, 2003; Coyer et al., 2007; Kenix, 2011; Lievrouw, 2011; Waltz, 2006). Yet this 
gap noted by Downing remains, in that number of rigorous studies that examine 
alternative media audiences is notably limited in current scholarship (Rauch, 2015). 
However, the recent series of seismic European events – e.g., the Greek crisis, the refugee 
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crisis, Brexit, Russia’s disinformation campaigns, etc. – suggests that alternative media 
potentially play a significant role in fomenting these contradictory dynamics within 
European political and public spaces in ways that are as politically and culturally diverse 
as Europe itself.  
In this exploratory paper, we seek to contribute insights towards redressing some 
of the aforementioned absences. Utilizing a selected part of the data set obtained from the 
2016 CATCH-EyoU comparative survey on European youth attitudes to political and 
civic engagement, we compare trust in media within younger Czech, Estonian and Greek 
news audiences (aged 14-25) as it pertains to those outlets they perceive as alternative in 
nature to professional media institutions. Employing cluster analysis and a multinomial 
regression, we seek to identify a typology of trust in alternative and professional media 
within this cross-cultural sample, and consider it further in light of both the developmental 
differences across age differentials as well as the respondents’ selected political attitudes 
as they link to the contextualized specificities of the three countries.  
Theory 
The conceptual accuracy of the definitional category alternative media has been 
problematized within recent critical scholarship. Professional and alternative media have 
come to be recognized as symbiotic and intertwined phenomena, leading to a replacement 
of their simple binary depiction with a more nuanced notion of them as a fluid continuum 
(cf. Harcup, 2005; Jackob, 2010; Kenix, 2011). However, Jennifer Rauch – when talking 
about research into alternative media audiences – argues that “the alternative–mainstream 
dialectic remains useful in a converged media environment where it helps users to make 
sense of the world and relate themselves to the larger cultural order” (Rauch, 2015, p. 
126), adding that media perceived as alternative are linked with “a distinct system of 
values and practices” (Rauch, 2015, p. 138). Following Rauch’s argument, we assume 
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that media consumers tend to make distinction between “the media” (mainstream, 
professional news media) and “other sources” or “alternative media”. Such distinction – 
though individual notions of “alternative media” and “professional media” held by the 
audience members are probably as variable and changeable over time and socio-political 
contexts as individual notions of categories such as “democracy”, “immigrant” or 
“political news” – refers to classification order the audiences apply on media and the 
public and political sphere in general. In other words, we assume that though audiences’ 
notions of alternative media represent a broad, heterogeneous (and in relation to 
professional media residual) category representing various non-mainstream types of 
information sources (cf. Jackob, 2010), the existence of the category reflects audiences’ 
classification of the public space and, along with that, distinct types of their attitudes to 
mainstream media (representing the larger cultural order) and to the broader political and 
public sphere. On the one hand, this relational conceptualization of alternative media 
might be considered limited for being too unspecific regarding what actual media are 
labelled as alternative by certain audience members in a certain time; on the other hand, 
we find this notion – acknowledging alternative media as category with floating, across-
contexts-changeable content but defined by its opposition to category of professional 
media – well appropriate for exploratory study aiming to study differences in audiences’ 
attitudes to the phenomenon across different national contexts. 
Drawing on Anthony Giddens’ notion of trust (Giddens, 1990), we conceive trust 
in alternative media – central to this study – as a form of social trust, i.e. as confidence in 
the reliability of alternative media. As such, it is expected to be linked with trust in 
professional media and with other forms of social and interpersonal trust. However, 
existing research provides rather limited and indirect insight into trust in alternative 
media, having primarily focused on the relation between exposure to alternative media 
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and the formation of political opinions (Jones, 2004; Choi et al. 2006; Tsfati, 2010; Tsfati 
& Ariely, 2014). Importantly, audiences’ use of alternative media has been suggested to 
be antinomial to trust in professional media – or as Yariv Tsfati puts it, “[w]hen they 
mistrust the media, they seek alternatives” (Tsfati, 2010, p. 22) – implying that trust in 
alternative media is linked with mistrust of professional media. In contrast, it has been 
suggested that trust in alternative and professional media are not mutually exclusive and 
that variations of their co-existence indicate distinct types of expectations linked with 
alternative media (Macková et al., 2017). Consequently, the first research question 
considered is:  
● RQ1: What types of media trust comprising trust in alternative and professional 
media can be identified? 
Moreover, we assume that trust in alternative media is – similar to general trust in 
media (Tsfati & Ariely, 2014) – linked with respondents’ political attitudes conditioned 
by the contextual specifics of their given national state. Furthermore, different forms of 
trust are unevenly distributed across different countries (Delhey & Newton, 2005). In 
post-socialist countries – including the Czech Republic – the levels of generalised trust 
in other people, in institutions and in media are relatively low (Beilmann & Lilleoja, 2015; 
Kõuts et al., 2013). In contrast, generalised social trust levels are rather high in Estonia, 
resembling more the patterns found in many “old” EU countries (Beilmann & Lilleoja, 
2015). However, the unprecedented economic crisis in Greece has severely undermined 
the credibility of political institutions there. Between 2007-2011, Greece witnessed the 
most striking decline in levels of political and general media trust among 26 EU countries 
(Armingeon & Guthmann, 2014; Fisher, 2016). In exploring this variability, this study 
employs a cross-cultural comparative perspective, seeking to delineate differences in trust 
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in alternative media in two different post-socialist countries – the Czech Republic and 
Estonia – and in Greece. The second research question therefore is:  
● RQ2: Do the distribution of the types of media trust and the political and social 
predictors of the types differ across the three states in a way that can be interpreted 
as resulting from their specific national political contexts and national media 
environments? 
Lastly, we employ a developmental perspective to explore whether trust in 
alternative media is associated with an individual’s developmental stage. Two competing 
hypotheses can be formulated in this respect. If one adopts a more traditional view of 
adolescence as a turbulent period of identity exploration, eroding adults’ influence and 
increasing adolescents’ orientation towards their peer culture (e.g., Dubas et al., 2003), 
then lower levels of trust in mainstream media are universally expected within younger 
individuals, as compared to adults. Alternatively, researchers focusing on development 
in context warn that macro-level societal phenomena, such as economic recessions, have 
the potential to disrupt adolescents’ adaptation as they filter through family and other 
proximal environments of youth development (Motti-Stefanidi et al., 2017). Socialization 
processes, which are expected to foment internalizing the norms and ideologies of society 
(Clausen, 1968), will subsequently have a more pronounced impact in early adulthood, 
as compared to adolescence, thus reflecting more accurately and specifically the 
tendencies and ongoing transitions to be found in a given social context. This implies that 
different developmental trends may be identified across the countries under study, 
regarding their respective historical, cultural, and socio-economic profiles. The third 
research question is therefore: 
● RQ3: Do the distribution of the types of media trust between adolescents and 
young adults and the dichotomy of “adolescents / young adults” as a predictor of 
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the types of media trust suggest a presence of a developmental pattern independent 
of national contexts? 
Methods 
Participants 
The study employs a data set (N = 3,654) collected concurrently – in November–
December 2016 – in the Czech Republic, Estonia and Greece.1 In each country, we 
conducted fully comparable survey with some questions (e.g. educational path) 
respectively tailored for adolescents (aged 14-18) and young adults (aged 19-25). 
Therefore, we may treat the sample as consisting of six sub-samples. Due to the specifics 
of each country’s educational system, the sub-samples differ in applied sampling 
procedures: 
● Czechia, older (N = 814): Data were collected in five Czech regions (Prague, 
Pardubice, Vysočina, South Moravia, Moravian-Silesian Region), using CAPI 
and CAWI interviewing (ratio 43:57) and applying quota sampling for each region 
(residency, gender, age, economic activity). 
● Czechia, younger (N = 514): All participants were high school students. Schools 
were randomly sampled in the five aforementioned regions. In these schools, all 
available 11th and 12th grade classes were tested. Overall, 54% of participants 
attended academically-oriented schools, while 46% attended vocationally-
oriented schools. Students completed written questionnaires in their classrooms. 
                                                 
1 Data used in this study are publicly available from University of Tartu Repository (Estonia; 
http://dx.doi.org/10.15155/repos-6), Zenodo (Greece; https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1013870), and 
Masaryk University Repository (Czech Republic; https://is.muni.cz/repo/1392845?lang=en). 
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● Estonia, older (N = 460): respondents were recruited in different educational 
institutions (universities, colleges and vocational schools), army recruits’ units, 
and local youth organizations across Estonia.  
● Estonia, younger (N = 564): respondents were recruited in various locations 
across Estonia (the capital city of Tallinn, the cities of Tartu and Narva, and six 
smaller towns) in different educational institutions (primarily gymnasiums but 
also vocational schools). Respondents in both age groups completed an online 
questionnaire (in Estonian or Russian, according to their choice). 
● Greece, older (N = 715): respondents were invited to participate via 
announcements posted in state-wide university campuses, youth organizations, 
workplaces, and social media. 68% of respondents were in school or training, 
while 52% were working full-time or part-time. All completed the written version 
of the questionnaire.  
● Greece, younger (N = 587): all respondents were students in the first grade of 
Lyceum (10th year of education) enrolled in 11 schools from the Athens 
metropolitan area (49%) and three neighbouring regions (51%). Questionnaire 
were completed in class on a voluntary basis after informed consent was obtained 
by their parents. Permission to enter the schools was granted by the Educational 
Policy Institute of the Greek Ministry of Education.  
Measures 
The dependent variables trust in professional media (“I consider most ‘professional 
media’ – TV, online, radio or print – as trustworthy sources of news and information”) 
and trust in alternative media (“I consider alternative online media as more trustworthy 
sources of news and information than professional media”) were recorded through a scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). These two variables are 
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explicitly related in a way outlined above: in line with Rauch (2015) and Jackob (2010), 
we assume they refer to a dichotomy the participants employ to draw a line between “the 
institutional media” and the other news and information sources.  
The independent variables include socio-demographic variables of gender, age 
and income indicating SES of the respondents’ family, a variable labelled political news 
indicating the participants’ interest in political information, and a set of variables 
indicating the participants’ general trust and their attitudes to politics and political 
institutions (democracy, authoritarianism, and alienation). Moreover, since the data 
collection was conducted shortly after the 2015-2016 migration crisis and during the 
ongoing crisis of the European Union (at the time marked by Brexit), we have decided to 
include two attitude variables referring to these polarizing topics that were expected to 
have a potential to affect the participants’ relation both to professional and alternative 
media: namely tolerance to refugees and immigrants, and EU view, i.e. the participants’ 
attitude to the European Union.  
For purpose of the analysis, age was dichotomized so it differentiates the 
participants as adolescents (i.e. aged 14-18) or young adults (i.e. aged 19-25). 
Income was assessed by asking: “Does the income of your household cover 
everything that its members need?”, with responses ranging from “not at all” (1) to 
“completely” (4). The variable of political news was assessed by the question: “What are 
the topics you follow?”, and by ticking “political issues” on a list. 
All of the following variables indicating attitudes used a response scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5): 
Trust comprises two items, one indicating interpersonal trust (“I feel that most 
people can be trusted”) and one indicating institutional trust (“I trust the national 
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government.”) The final score was computed with averaged items (Greece: α = .52; 
Czechia: α = .53; Estonia: α = .48).  
Democracy. Support for a democracy was measured by an item “Democracy is 
the best system of government that I know”. Originally, two items were used but due to 
their low consistency only this one was chosen, considered as more comprehensible for 
our participants.   
Authoritarianism was measured using two items: “Instead of needing ‘civil rights 
and freedoms’ our country needs one thing only: law and order” and “Obeying and 
respecting authority are the most important values that we should teach our children”. 
The score was computed with averaged items (Greece: α = .64; Czechia: α = .62; Estonia: 
α = .61). 
Alienation was measured by 4 items. Two of them addressed the EU level of 
government, the other two the national level – on both levels, one item addressed personal 
and one item institutional alienation, with higher scoring referring to a higher level of 
alienation. The score was computed with averaged items (Greece: α = .81; Czechia: α = 
.85; Estonia: α = .88). 
Tolerance measured by 6 items was indicated by support for helping refugees and 
support for refugee and immigrant rights. The score was computed with averaged items 
(Greece: α = .7; Czechia: α = .72; Estonia: α = .75). 
EU view used two items: “Life in my country would be better if there were no 
European Union” and “We should be happy that the European Union exists”. The latter 
scale was reversed, with higher scoring referring to a more positive view of the EU. The 
score was computed with averaged items (Greece: α = .75; Czechia: α = .79; Estonia: α 
= .72). 
(Table 1 about here) 
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Data analyses 
In the first step, we ran a hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s criterion based on 
identifying the pairs of clusters that lead to a minimum increase of total within-cluster 
variance after merging (Borgen & Barett, 1987; Ketchen & Shook, 1996). The initial 
macro-cluster analysis considered the variables trust in alternative media and trust in 
professional media. After drawing the profiles of 2 to 7 clusters, we opted to work further 
with the 5-clusters solution as best fitting the aims of the study – being detailed enough 
to describe compelling relations between the two variables and yet offering a robust 
numbers of cases in each cluster for further analysis. 
In the second step, we used multinomial logistic regression aiming to test the 
aforementioned independent variables as predictors of the five identified types of media 
trust across the three national sub-samples. 
Results 
Regarding RQ1: The cluster solution based on the interaction of trust in professional 
media and trust in alternative media suggests outcomes in the following five clusters: 
● Professional media trust (“Trust PROF”) includes respondents trusting 
professional media (scoring > 3 on the scale of trust in professional media) but 
distrusting alternative media (scoring <3 on the scale of trust in alternative media). 
● General media trust (“Trust all”) includes respondents expressing trust in 
professional media along with indifference or trust in alternative media (scoring 
> 3 on the scale of trust in professional media and > 2 on the scale of trust in 
alternative media). 
● Alternative media trust (“Trust ALT”) includes respondents expressing 
indifference or distrust to professional media (scoring < 4 on the scale of trust in 
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professional media) and, at the same time, indifference or trust in alternative 
media (scoring > 2 on the scale of trust in alternative media). 
● General media distrust (“Distrust all”) included respondents expressing 
indifference or distrust in professional media (scoring < 4 on the scale of trust in 
professional media) and, simultaneously, distrust in alternative media (scoring < 
3 on the scale of trust in alternative media). 
● General media indifference (“Indifferent”) included respondents expressing 
neither trust nor distrust both in professional media and alternative media (scoring 
3 on both scales). 
These clusters are distributed unevenly in the three national samples – general 
media trust and, especially, professional media trust are more frequent in Estonia, 
alternative media trust is more pronounced in Greece, and the Czech participants lie in 
between (p < .001).  
(Figure 1 about here) 
These differences between countries in the distribution of the clusters are 
significant when we focus on the younger and older sub-samples: in Greece, a shift is 
observed from general media trust among adolescents to alternative media trust among 
young adults; in Estonia, the initial point is similar (i.e., general media trust or even 
general media indifference in adolescence) with it moving however towards professional 
media trust in adulthood; the Czech Republic stands in opposition to Greece, with more 
adolescents trusting alternative media and more young adults trusting all media.  
For a more detailed analysis of the differences, we interpret the results of the 
multinomial regression (using the cluster solution as the dependent variable and 
Alternative media trust as the reference category; see Tables 2-4). 
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(Table 2 about here) 
(Table 3 about here) 
(Table 4 about here) 
The three models suggest that age plays a substantial role only in Greece where 
age group is significant in the case of all clusters, increasing the odds for moving to trust 
in alternative media for older respondents. Regarding RQ3: The mere distribution of 
media trust types between adolescents and young adults implies that the development of 
media trust differs across the three-analyzed countries, i.e. suggesting the impact of the 
socioeconomic and cultural context. However, the dichotomy of “adolescents / young 
adults” as a significant predictor demonstrably influencing the overall dynamics of the 
identified typology of media trust was observed in Greece only. 
In general, the models show obvious differences between the countries, indicating 
that media trust is – as expected – highly dependent on contexts. According to the models, 
the only predictors playing more a substantial role in all three states, and therefore 
establishing some common patterns for trust in alternative media, are the respondents’ 
view of the European Union and gender. Relative to trust in alternative media, higher 
scoring in EU view predicts higher odds for professional media trust in Estonia and 
Czechia (Estonia: OR = 2.45, Czechia: OR = 1.89), general media trust (Estonia: OR = 
1.59, Czechia: OR = 1.63) and general media distrust (Estonia: OR = 1.41, Czechia: OR 
= 1.27), and for professional media trust (OR = 1.83) and general media trust in Greece 
(OR = 1.25). Gender increases in Estonia females’ odds for trust in professional media 
(OR = 2.56) and for general media trust (OR = 2.3), in Greece for general media trust 
(OR = 1.52) and in Czechia for general media indifference (OR = 1.42). 
Moreover, partial patterns are linked with trust, authoritarianism and income: In 
Czechia, higher scoring in trust increases odds for general media trust (OR = 1.75) and 
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general media indifference (OR = 1.5), and in Greece for trust in professional media (OR 
= 1.21), general media trust (OR = 1.92) and general media indifference (OR = 1.27). 
Higher income decreases in Czechia general media trust (OR = .58) and general media 
indifference (OR: .64); in Greece it increases general media distrust (OR = 1.29). And, 
in Estonia, higher scores of authoritarianism decrease the odds for trust in professional 
media (OR = .66) and increase the odds for general media trust (OR = 1.35), while in 
Greece they increase the odds for general media trust (OR = 1.61) and general media 
indifference (OR = 1.26). 
Other significant predictors underline national specificities. While in Czechia 
exposure to political news decreases the odds for trust in professional media (OR: 0.63) 
and increases the odds for general media indifference (OR = 1.46), in Greece it slightly 
increases chances for trust in professional media (OR = 1.15). In Czechia, higher scores 
in democracy increase the odds for trust in professional media (OR = 1.46), and tolerance 
increases the odds for general media distrust (OR = 1.33). And in Greece, alienation 
decreases the odds for general media distrust (OR = .86). 
However, wholly coherent and strong relationship patterns across all countries 
were not observed. Both the differences in distribution of media trust types across the 
sub-samples and in the selected predictors of media trust imply observed differences 
emerging from specific political and media contexts, in line with RQ2. 
Discussion 
Generally, with the exception of the participants’ gender and relation to the EU, wholly 
coherent, strong relationship patterns across all countries were not observed. Importantly 
for the focus of the study, the EU represents a crucial topic in all three countries, with 
links between trust in alternative media and negative attitudes toward the EU, suggesting 
the interpretation of alternative media as alternative in a political sense.  
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The absence of other stronger patterns suggests several interpretations: that trust 
in alternative media is rather context-dependent; that current broadly available alternative 
media represent a very diverse terrain consisting of various and antithetic outlets and 
channels; that alternative media is still quite a new and culturally unstable phenomenon; 
and that young people do not have fully crystallized understandings of it.  
The latter two interpretations must be considered as possible yet speculative here 
as the study’s design provides no direct supporting evidence.  
The interpretation of the differences as context-dependent – corroborating the 
thesis regarding the influence of macro-level societal phenomena on the process of 
development (cf. Motti-Stefanidi et al., 2017) – is supported by the developmental 
pathways differing in the three countries and by the nationally specific predictors of 
media trust. The negative relationship between authoritarianism and trust in professional 
media in Estonia and the positive relationship between authoritarianism and general 
media trust in Estonia and Greece may indicate higher tension between mainstream media 
expressing anti-authoritarian ideology and (some) right-wing alternative media channels. 
In Czechia, in contrast, the positive relationship between tolerance and general media 
distrust might be seen as symptomatic of tolerant participants’ dissatisfaction with the 
intolerant tone of professional media (cf. Tkaczyk, 2017).  
Lastly, interpreting the absence of stronger patterns as resulting from the diversity 
of alternative media finds its support in the typology of media trust. The typology depicts 
trust in alternative and professional media as intertwined phenomena and suggests that 
the terrain of alternative media and their youth audiences is quite diverse. Quite possibly, 
more sub-groups of young audiences represent a broader spectrum of views and 
dispositions including different reasoning and various expectations towards the media, 
both professional and alternative. Complementarily, the very existence of the general 
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media trust cluster may indicate young audiences’ use of alternative media as not simply 
opposing professional media but rather as broadening their agenda. 
Limitations 
Several limitations within this exploratory study should be considered. First, the results 
might be affected by differences in sampling procedures applied across the sub-samples. 
Secondly, the study employs – as explained above in the theoretical chapter – a relational 
notion of alternative media as of a category defined not by its particular content but by its 
position towards the category of professional media. Therefore, the study uses indication 
of trust in alternative media relying on the item identifying trust in media perceived by 
the respondents as alternative (instead of an item based on definition provided in the 
questionnaire), and the participants were expected to respond – and responded, as the 
results imply – with different respective conceptualizations. This enables us to employ 
comparative perspective as this approach brackets the particular differences between the 
media environments in the three countries. However, the study – as a collateral outcome 
from the broader CATCH-EyoU survey – never directly sought details of these 
conceptualizations, either for the participants’ reasons for (dis)trust in alternative media 
or their exposure to alternative media that might provide a more thorough understanding 
of the phenomenon. 
Thirdly, trust in alternative media, trust in professional media and support for democracy 
were measured by one item each, which may have affected the reliability of the items. As 
the topic of trust in media is rather unambiguous and plays usually only ancillary role in 
the questionnaires, and as consensus on standardized measures is missing so far, single-
item measures are, nevertheless, common in research of trust in media (cf. Jones, 2004; 
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Kaufhold, Valenzuela & Gil de Zúniga, 2010; Lee, 2010; PEW, 2016; Edelman, 2015; 
Watkins et al., 2015).  
  
Conclusions and future directions 
This study offers comparative insights into relations between trust in alternative and 
professional media. Despite its limitations, the findings nonetheless illustrate a diversity 
of relations between the two types of media trust, creating thus an important basis for 
further inquiry. Future research into alternative media and their audiences should 
explicitly consider the variability of the phenomena across/within particular states. 
However, a more thorough understanding will require addressing the specific audience 
proclivities related to alternative media and the broader scope and definition of 




This study was produced as a part of the CATCH-EyoU project that has received 
funding from  the  European  Union’s  Horizon  2020  research  and  innovation  
programme  under  G.A. n. 649538. The study reflects only the authors’ view. The 
Research Executive Agency of  the  European  Commission  is  not  responsible  for  
any  use  that  may  be  made  of  the  information it contains. This work was also 
supported by Fulbright Commission under Fulbright Visiting Scholars Program 
[E0560831], and by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research grant [IUT 20-
38]. 
TRUST IN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA  18 
 
References 
Armingeon, G. (2014). Declining support for national democracy in European 
countries. European Journal of Political Research, 53(3), 423-442. 
Bailey, O. G., Cammaerts, B., & Carpentier, N. (2008). Understanding Alternative 
Media: Issues in Cultural and Media Studies. Maidenhead: Open University 
Press. 
Beilmann, M., & Lilleoja, L. (2015). Social Trust and Value Similarity: the 
Relationship between Social Trust and Human Values in Europe. Studies of 
Transition States and Societies, 7, 19–30. Retrieved from 
http://publications.tlu.ee/index.php/stss/article/view/267 
Borgen, F. H., & Barnett, D. C. (1987). Applying cluster analysis in counseling 
psychology research. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 34(4), 456-468. 
Choi, J. H., Watt, J. H., & Lynch, M. (2006). Perceptions of news credibility about the 
war in Iraq: Why war opponents perceived the Internet as the most credible 
medium. Journal of Computer‐Mediated Communication, 12(1), 209-229. 
Clausen, J. A. (Ed.) (1968). Socialization and society. Boston, MA: Little Brown and 
Company. 
Couldry, N., & Curran, J. (Eds.). (2003). Contesting media power: Alternative media in 
a networked world. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Delhey, J., & Newton, K. (2005). Predicting cross-national levels of social trust: global 
pattern or Nordic exceptionalism? European Sociological Review, 21(4), 311–
327. 
TRUST IN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA  19 
Ketchen, D., Jr., & Shook, C. L. (1996). The application of cluster analysis in strategic 
management research: An analysis and critique. Strategic Management Journal, 
17(6), 441-458. 
Downing, J. D. (2003). Audiences and readers of alternative media: The absent lure of 
the virtually unknown. Media, Culture & Society, 25(5), 625-645. 
Downing, J. D. (2003). Audiences and readers of alternative media: The absent lure of 
the virtually unknown. Media, Culture & Society, 25(5), 625-645. 
Dubas, J. S., Miller, K., & Petersen, A. C. (2003). The study of adolescence during the 
20th century. History of the Family, 8, 375-397. 
Edelman. (2015). Edelman trust barometer 2015 - Annual global study: Australia. 
Edelman Trust Barometer - Annual Global Study. New York, NY: Edelman.com 
Fisher, C. (2016). The trouble with 'trust' in news media. Communication Research and 
Practice, 2(4), 451-465. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Harcup, T. (2005). “I'm Doing this to Change the World”: journalism in alternative and 
mainstream media. Journalism Studies, 6(3), 361-374. 
Jackob, N. G. E. (2010). No alternatives? The relationship between perceived media 
dependency, use of alternative information sources, and general trust in mass 
media. International Journal of Communication, 4, 18. 
Jones, D. A. (2004). Why Americans don’t trust the media: A preliminary analysis. 
Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 9(2), 60-75. 
Kaufhold, K., Valenzuela, S., & De Zúniga, H. G. (2010). Citizen journalism and 
democracy: How user-generated news use relates to political knowledge and 
participation. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 87(3-4), 515-529. 
TRUST IN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA  20 
Kenix, L.J. (2011). Alternative and mainstream media. The converging spectrum. 
London: Bloomsbury. 
Kiousis, S. 2001. Public trust or mistrust? Perceptions of media credibility in the 
information age. Mass Communication & Society, 4(4), 381-403. 
Kõuts, R., Vihalemm, P., & Lauristin, M. (2013). Trust in the context of audience 
fragmentation. CM: Communication Management Quarterly, 26, 77–102. 
Lee, T. T. (2010). Why they don’t trust the media: An examination of factors predicting 
trust. American Behavioral Scientist, 54(1), 8-21. 
Lievrouw, L.A. (2011). Alternative and activist new media. Cambridge: Polity. 
Macková, A., Šerek, J., & Macek J. (2017). Young People’s Trust in Media: Between 
Mainstream and Alternative News Sources. At:1st CATCH-EyoU Conference, 
Athens. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.15368.42241 
Motti-Stefanidi, F., Papathanasiou, N., Mastrotheodoros, S., & Pavlopoulos, V. (2017). 
Youth adaptation during the current great economic recession in Greece: Risk 
and resilience. In A. C. Petersen, S. H. Koller, F. Motti-Stefanidi, & S. Verma 
(Eds.), Positive youth development in global contexts of social and economic 
change (pp. 98-109). London: Routledge. 
PEW. (2016). The modern news consumer. Pew Research Centre. Retrieved from 
http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/the-modern-news-consumer/ 
Rauch, J. (2015). Exploring the Alternative–Mainstream Dialectic: What “Alternative 
Media” Means to a Hybrid Audience. Communication, Culture & Critique, 8(1), 
124-143. 
Tkaczyk, M. (2017). Mediální pokrytí tzv. migrační krize v online zpravodajství 
(Novinky, iDnes, ČT24.cz) – základní výsledky obsahové analýzy. (Working 
paper.) Brno: Masaryk University. 
TRUST IN ALTERNATIVE MEDIA  21 
Tsfati, Y. (2010). Online news exposure and trust in the mainstream media: Exploring 
possible associations. American Behavioral Scientist, 54(1), 22-42. 
Tsfati, Y., & Ariely, G. (2014). Individual and contextual correlates of trust in media 
across 44 countries. Communication Research, 41(6), 760-782. 
Waltz, M. (2006). Alternative and Activist Media. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Watkins, J., Park, S., Blood, W., Dunne Breen, M., Fuller, G., Papandrea, F., & 
Ricketson, M. (2015). Digital news report: Australia 2015. Canberra. Retrieved 
from http://apo.org.au/ resource/digital-news-report-australia-2015 
TRUST IN ALTERNATIVE AND PROFESSIONAL MEDIA 1 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of the clusters in the sub-samples. 
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Table 1. Distribution of variables in the sub-samples. 
  Greece Czech Republic Estonia 
  Younger Older Younger Older Younger Older 
 Mean / SD Mean / SD Mean / SD Mean / SD Mean / SD Mean / SD 
Trust in prof. media 3.18 / 1.23 2.57 / 1.06 2.93 / 1.08 3.14 / 1.01 3.29 / 0.96 3.43 / 0.98 
Trust in alt. media 3.02 / 0.99 3.17 / 0.99 2.78 / 0.88 2.89 / 0.93 2.84 / 0.89 2.36 / 0.97 
 
Females 60.2% 51.5% 55.8% 55.2% 61.6% 65.3% 
Age 15.1 / 0.40 22.03 / 1.85 16.76 / 0.72 22.74 / 1.75 16.71 / 0.74 20.52 / 1.71 
Income 3.23 / 0.68 3.13 / 0.73 3.61 / 0.65 3.33 / 0.81 3.27 / 0.79 3.32 / 0.81 
Parents' education 3.72 / 1.26 3.9 / 1.20 4.12 / 1.04 4.01 / 1.01 4.18 / 0.94 4.67 / 0.93 
 
Political news 67.2% 43.2% 59.5% 49.9% 58.2% 28.0% 
Institutional trust 2.05 / 0.94 2.12 / 0.90 2.55 / 0.87 2.53 / 1.04 2.93 / 0.96 2.66 / 0.98 
Social trust 2.25 / 0.97 1.66 / 0.82 2.33 / 0.97 2.49 / 0.98 2.55 / 1.02 3.04 / 0.96 
Democracy 4.03 / 1.01 4.07 / 1.09 3.53 / 1.00 3.69 / 1.04 3.73 / 0.97 4.10 / 1.00 
EU view 3.23 / 0.88 3.07 / 1.03 3.47 / 0.96 3.27 / 1.02 3.63 / 0.86 4.02 / 0.81 
Tolerance 3.10 / 0.77 3.50 / 0.83 2.56 / 0.75 2.64 / 0.85 2.80 / 0.69 3.18 / 0.79 
Authoritarianism 3.06 / 1.10 2.46 / 1.16 3.47 / 0.87 3.40 / 0.99 2.76 / 0.89 2.09 / 0.85 
Alienation 3.37 / 0.98 3.61 / 1.00 3.45 / 0.88 3.44 / 1.03 3.36 / 0.94 2.86 / 1.04 
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Table 2. Nominal regression – parameter estimates, Greece (N = 1302). 
ref. category: trust in alternative 
media 
Trust in professional 
media 
Trust all Distrust all Indifferent 
B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR 
Intercept  -6.14 (1.30***   -4.03 (0.83)***   -1.07 (0.83)   -2.72 (0.87)**   
Gender (ref. males) 0.19 (0.25) 1.21 0.42 (0.71)* 1.52 0.21 (0.18) 1.08 0.18 (0.18) 1.19 
Income 0.24 (0.18) 1.27 0.18 (0.12) 1.20 0.26 (0.12)* 1.29 0.16 (0.12) 1.18 
Age groups (ref. older) 1.06 (0.26)*** 2.90 0.91 (0.18)*** 1.15 0.66 (0.18)*** 1.94 0.47 (0.19)* 1.60 
Political news 0.91 (0.18)*** 1.15 0.07 (0.18) 1.07 0.07 (0.18) 1.07 0.14 (0.18) 1.16 
Trust  0.40 (0.17)* 1.21 0.65 (0.11)*** 1.92 -0.03 (0.12) 0.97 0.24 (0.12)* 1.27 
Democracy 0.14 (0.13) 1.16 -0.08 (0.08) 0.93 -0.05 (0.08) 0.95 0.04 (0.08) 1.04 
Authoritarianism 0.12 (0.12) 1.13 0.48 (0.08)*** 1.61 0.10 (0.08) 1.10 0.23 (0.09)** 1.26 
Alienation -0.04 (0.13) 0.96 -0.09 (0.09) 0.91 -0.21 (0.09)* 0.82 -0.11 (0.09) 0.90 
Tolerance  -0.11 (0.17) 0.90 -0.15 (0.12) 0.86 -0.12 (0.11) 0.89 0.03 (0.12) 1.03 
EU view 0.60 (0.15)*** 1.83 0.22 (0.10)* 1.25 0.06 (0.10) 1.07 0.03 (0.10) 1.03 
Model c2 (df) 3470.174 (40) 
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.198 
R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.188 
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. SE = Standard error. OR = Odds ratio. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
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Table 3. Nominal regression – parameter estimates, Czech Republic (N = 1328). 
ref. category: trust in alternative 
media 
Trust in professional 
media 
Trust all Distrust all Indifferent 
B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR 
Intercept -4.94 (1.02)***  -4.24 (0.85)***  -2.20 (0.91)  -2.18 (0.87)*  
Gender (ref. males) 0.12 (0.20) 1.12 0.09 (0.17) 1.10 -0.04 (0.19) 0.96 0.35 (0.18)* 1.42 
Income -0.34 (0.20) 0.71 -0.54 (0.18)** 0.58 -0.27 (0.19) 0.76 -0.45 (0.19)* 0.64 
Age groups (ref. older) 0.11 (0.14) 1.11 -0.22 (0.11) 0.81 0.06 (0.13) 1.06 -0.11 (0.12) 0.90 
Political news -0.47 (0.20)* 0.63 0.10 (0.17) 1.10 0.18 (0.19) 1.20 0.38 (0.18)* 1.46 
Trust  0.20 (0.13) 1.22 0.56 (0.11)*** 1.75 -0.09 (0.13) 0.91 0.41 (0.12)*** 1.50 
Democracy 0.38 (0.10)*** 1.46 0.19 (0.09)* 1.20 0.09 (0.09) 1.09 0.09 (0.09) 1.09 
Authoritarianism 0.01 (0.11) 1.01 0.13 (0.10) 1.14 0.00 (0.11) 1.00 0.02 (0.10) 1.02 
Alienation -0.10 (0.11) 0.91 0.18 (0.10) 1.20 -0.01 (0.11) 0.99 -0.03 (0.11) 0.97 
Tolerance  0.23 (0.14) 1.26 0.11 (0.12) 1.11 0.29 (0.13)* 1.33 0.16 (0.13) 1.18 
EU view 0.64 (0.12)*** 1.89 0.49 (0.10)*** 1.63 0.24 (0.11)* 1.27 0.12 (0.10) 1.13 
Model c2 (df) 4023.098 (40) 
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.180 
R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.172 
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. SE = Standard error. OR = Odds ratio. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
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Table 4. Nominal regression – parameter estimates, Estonia (N = 1024). 
ref. category: trust in alternative 
media 
Trust in professional 
media 
Trust all Distrust all Indifferent 
B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR B (S.E.) OR 
Intercept -2.48 (1.26)*  -3.18 (1.18)**  -0.51 (1.19)  -0.25 (1.17)  
Gender (ref. males) 0.94 (0.27)*** 2.56 0.83 (0.25)** 2.3 0.37 (0.26) 1.44 0.30 (0.26) 1.35 
Income -0.26 (0.28) 0.77 0.34 (0.27) 1.40 -0.04 (0.28) 0.96 0.49 (0.28) 1.63 
Age groups (ref. older) 0.07 (0.17) 1.07 -0.21 (0.15) 0.81 0.00 (0.16) 1.00 -0.19 (0.16) 0.83 
Political news -0.40 (0.27) 2.56 -0.26 (0.25) 0.77 -0.23 (0.26) 0.80 0.23 (0.26) 1.25 
Trust  0.18 (0.17) 1.12 0.54 (0.17)** 1.71 -0.10 (0.17) 0.90 0.21 (0.17) 1.23 
Democracy 0.19 (0.13) 1.21 0.14 (0.13) 1.15 0.02 (0.13) 1.02 -0.10 (0.13) 0.91 
Authoritarianism -0.42 (0.16)** 0.66 0.30 (0.15)* 1.35 -0.29 (0.15) 0.75 0.29 (0.15) 1.33 
Alienation -0.17 (0.14) 0.85 -0.00 (0.14) 1.00 0.16 (0.14) 1.17 -0.09 (0.14) 0.91 
Tolerance  -0.16 (0.18) 0.85 -0.10 (0.18) 0.91 0.04 (0.18) 1.05 -0.11 (0.18) 0.89 
EU view 0.90 (0.17)*** 2.45 0.46 (0.15)** 1.59 0.34 (0.16)* 1.41 0.16 (0.15) 1.17 
Model c2 (df) 2773.700 (40) 
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.282 
R2 (Cox & Snell) 0.270 
Note. B = Unstandardized regression coefficient. SE = Standard error. OR = Odds ratio. *** p < .001. ** p < .01. * p < .05. 
 
 
